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Abstract
We study the implications of procedural fairness on income taxation. We formulate
procedural fairness as a particular non-cooperative bargaining game and examine the
stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the game. The equilibrium outcome is called
tax equilibrium and is shown to be unique. The procedurally fair tax rate is defined
as the tax rate that results in the limit of tax equilibria when the probability that
negotiations break down converges to zero. The procedurally fair tax rate is shown
to be unique. We also provide a characterization of the procedurally fair tax rate
that involves the probability mass of below average income citizens and a particular
measure of the citizens’ boldness. This characterization is then used to show that
in a number of interesting cases the procedurally fair tax rate equals the probability
mass of below average income citizens.
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1 Introduction
Modern societies redistribute significant shares of their total income to improve upon the
fairness of the income distribution. At the same time, the literature in economics offers
very few guidelines to determine what fraction of total income should be redistributed if
the end result has to be fair. The standard approach follows Mirrlees (1971) and consists of
specifying a social welfare function that has to be optimized, without explaining where the
social welfare function comes from and how the social welfare function should be chosen. A
notable exception is Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006), who derive the social welfare function
on the basis of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and a condition precluding redistibution
when all agents have the same skills.
One may distinguish fair allocations from fair procedures to decide upon the allocation.
Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (2005) argue that procedural fairness is conceptually dis-
tinct from allocation fairness, although the two are linked in important ways. This paper is
concerned with procedural fairness. Procedures are deemed fair if they create equal chances
for persons involved in the procedure. It is equal opportunities that matters rather than
an equal allocation that results. Fair procedures are often used in decision making when
there is no clear candidate for a fair allocation. An example of a fair procedure is where
an allocation of goods is based on a random lottery. In this case, using a fair procedure
comes at a huge cost, the loss of efficiency.
In this paper we consider a fair procedure, called the unanimous approval procedure,
that does not suffer from efficiency losses. In the unanimous approval procedure, all citizens
in the society have an equal chance of making a proposal. A proposal is only carried out
if it is approved by everyone, which is in accordance with the contractarian approach. If
one of the citizens rejects, each citizen has the same chance to become the new proposer,
and so on, and so forth. The unanimous approval procedure is a natural extension of
the alternating offers bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982) to the case with more than
two players. A difference is that in the unanimous approval procedure the citizens do not
alternate or rotate in making proposals, but are selected with equal probability in every
bargaining round, thereby following the approach of Binmore (1987). The unanimous
approval procedure follows as a special case of the bargaining models of collective choice
considered in Banks and Duggan (2000), when we restrict recognition probabilities to be
uniform and replace approval by a coalition within a collection of decisive coalitions by
unanimous approval. Contrary to the approach in Banks and Duggan (2000), we intend
to use bargaining models of collective choice as normative tools here.
We apply the unanimous approval procedure to income taxation. We consider a society
with citizens that are characterized by their productivity level and their utility function,
where the distribution of characteristics is given by some probability measure. Due to
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the heterogeneity in productivity and preferences, there is no clear candidate for a fair
allocation. Neither is there a clear candidate for a social welfare function.
We analyze the case where citizens use the unanimous approval procedure to decide
upon the desired tax rate. Each citizen has an equal chance to make a proposal, a proposal
of a citizen specifies a tax rate, and a particular proposal is only implemented if all citizens
approve of it. One may think of this as a stylized way to model an ideal direct democracy or
as a stylized way to establish a social contract. We assume tax rates to be non-negative. For
reasons of incentive compatibility, after-tax income should be increasing in pre-tax income,
which implies that tax rates are less than or equal to one. A tax rate of zero corresponds
to the situation of laissez-faire and a tax rate of one to complete redistribution.
Citizens with below average pre-tax income would prefer complete redistribution, whereas
citizens with above average pre-tax income have a tax rate of zero as their most preferred
tax policy. Since tax rates are chosen in the unit interval, our analysis leads to the analysis
of one-dimensional bargaining problems. In the bargaining and political economy litera-
ture, such problems are also studied in Banks and Duggan (2000), Imai and Salonen (2000),
Cho and Duggan (2003), Kalandrakis (2006), Cardona and Ponsat´ı (2007), Predtetchinski
(2007), and Herings and Predtetchinski (2010), though none of these models captures the
specification presented here.
After each round of the unanimous approval procedure, there is some probability that
negotiations break down. We define a tax equilibrium as the outcomes induced by station-
ary subgame perfect equilibria of the unanimous approval procedure for a given breakdown
probability. A tax equilibrium is characterized by the unique proposal made by all above
average income citizens and the unique proposal made by all below average income citizens.
It is shown that in equilibrium the proposals made are accepted unanimously without delay
and that tax equilibria are unique. Below average income citizens propose a strictly higher
tax rate than above average income citizens.
Next we define the procedurally fair tax rate as the limit of the proposals in a tax
equilibrium when the breakdown probability converges to zero. We show that every society
has a uniquely determined procedurally fair tax rate. The procedurally fair tax rate admits
a characterization in terms of the probability mass of citizens with below average income
and an appropriate measure of boldness of the citizens. As shown in Roth (1989), boldness
at a certain consumption level corresponds to the maximum probability by which a citizen
prefers a particular gamble over getting the consumption level for sure. Boldness equals the
first derivative of the utility function divided by utility itself. Tax rate boldness is defined
as boldness applied to the indirect utility function in terms of tax rates. We argue that the
bargaining power of the below average income citizens at a particular tax rate is equal to
the supremum of tax rate boldness among them multiplied by their probability mass. The
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bargaining power of the above average income citizens is defined similarly. We demonstrate
that the procedurally fair tax rate is the unique tax rate for which the bargaining power
of the below average income citizens is equal to that of the above average income citizens.
Our characterization of the procedurally fair tax rate is extremely helpful in computa-
tions. For instance, in societies where productivity levels have unbounded support and all
citizens have the same preferences exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, the procedu-
rally fair tax rate is given by the probability mass of below average income citizens.
We also consider heterogeneous societies, where the only assumption on preferences is
that both among below average income citizens and among above average income citizens,
there are citizens that are close to being risk neutral. We obtain a simple expression for
the procedurally fair tax rate, irrespective of the distribution of productivity levels. When
this distribution has unbounded support, we find again that the procedurally fair tax rate
is given by the probability mass of below average income citizens.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the primitives
of our society and Section 3 discusses the unanimous approval procedure. Section 4 defines
the notion of tax equilibrium, studies the relation to stationary subgame perfect equilib-
ria of the unanimous approval procedure when applied to our society, and derives some
properties of tax equilibria. Section 5 defines the procedurally fair tax rate and provides
a characterization, which is used in Section 6 to argue that in sufficiently heterogeneous
societies the procedurally fair tax rate is equal to the probability mass of below average
income citizens. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Society
We consider a society composed of citizens in a set N , which may contain finitely or
infinitely many elements. The characteristics of citizens are described by (wt, ut)t∈N and
a probability measure µ. A citizen of type t ∈ N has productivity wt ∈ R. He derives no
disutility from labor, works one unit of time, and has a pre-tax income of wt. It would be
natural to assume that wt is non-negative, but in order to simplify some of the proofs in
this paper, it is helpful to allow for the more general case where pre–tax income could be
negative.
The triple (N,A, µ) denotes a probability space, where N is the set of citizens, A a
sigma–algebra of subsets of N , and µ a probability measure that represents the distribution
of types within the population. We assume wt to be measurable and integrable and we let
w¯ =
∫
t∈N
wtdµ(t).
denote the average income. Furthermore, we denote the types with below average, average,
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and above average income by N−, N0, and N+, respectively. We make the regularity
assumption that the probability is zero that a citizen has productivity exactly equal to the
average level, µ(N0) = 0.
Assumption 2.1: The function wt is measurable and integrable. Moreover, µ(N
0) = 0,
µ(N−) > 0, and µ(N+) > 0.
We let m− = µ(N−) and m+ = µ(N+) be the probability mass of citizens with below
and above average income, respectively.
We address the question of the share of total income that should be redistributed in
order to reach a procedurally fair income distribution. To do so we consider all possible
affine tax functions, characterized by parameters α and β. After-tax income α+ (1− β)wt
of a citizen of type t is an affine function of pre-tax income, and β is equal to the tax rate.
Under the requirement of a balanced budget, we find that
α + (1− β)w¯ = w¯,
so α = βw¯. The tax rate β coincides with the share of total pre-tax income that is redis-
tributed. As a function of the tax rate β, after-tax income is equal to
βw¯ + (1− β)wt = wt + β(w¯ − wt).
Not all tax rates β are feasible. We assume that β is greater than or equal to 0, a re-
quirement that would follow if incomes are required to be non-negative and the infimum
of productivity levels in the support of µ is equal to zero. For reasons of incentive com-
patibility, after-tax income should be increasing in pre-tax income, which implies that β is
less than or equal to one.
When β = 0 we obtain the situation of laissez-faire, where after-tax income is equal
to pre-tax income. The case β = 1 corresponds to complete redistribution. Since we will
assume utility functions to be strictly increasing, a citizen’s preferred point is laissez-faire
when his income is above w¯ and complete redistribution for income below w¯. A household
with average income is indifferent with regard to the tax policy chosen.
A citizen of type t evaluates the after–tax income using a von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function ut : [`t,+∞)→ R. Since we have allowed for negative pre–tax income, we
also allow for a negative `t rather than simply imposing `t = 0.
Assumption 2.2: For each t ∈ N the utility function ut is continuous, concave, strictly
increasing, and ut(`t) = 0. Moreover, `t ≤ wt if t ∈ N−, `t ≤ w¯ if t ∈ N+, and `t < w¯ if
t ∈ N0.
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If the tax rate β ∈ [0, 1] is agreed upon, citizen t enjoys a utility of
vt(β) = ut(wt + β(w¯ − wt)).
The function vt : [0, 1]→ R defined by the above equation is the indirect utility function of
type t. The indirect utility function vt is non–negative, continuous, and concave. Moreover,
it holds that vt(β) > 0 whenever 0 < β < 1. For each t ∈ N0, vt is a positive constant. For
each t ∈ N−, vt is strictly increasing while for each t ∈ N+ it is strictly decreasing.
Consider some t ∈ N−∪N+. We denote the inverse of the utility function ut by xt. For
υ a feasible utility level of citizen t, we define
ht(υ) =
wt − xt(υ)
wt − w¯ .
The function ht, restricted to the domain of feasible indirect utility levels, is the inverse of
the indirect utility function vt. For each t ∈ N− the function ht is strictly increasing and
convex while for each t ∈ N+ it is strictly decreasing and concave.
3 The Unanimous Approval Procedure
The citizens in the society face a set of feasible tax rates given by B = [0, 1]. To determine
the procedurally fair tax rate, we study what tax rate will be chosen when citizens use the
unanimous approval procedure. The unanimous approval procedure is defined as follows.
In every period, each citizen has an equal chance to be selected as the proposer. More
precisely, we have that a citizen of type t is selected as the proposer according to the
probability measure µ. If in period τ a citizen of type t is selected as the proposer, he
makes a proposal pt ∈ B. After observing pt, citizens sequentially decide whether to accept
or to reject the proposal in a fixed a priorily chosen order. The latter assumption is made
for notational simplicity and can be generalized substantially without affecting our results.
If all citizens accept, then pt is implemented and the utility of a citizen of type i is given by
vi(pt). As soon as a citizen rejects, the procedure breaks down with probability 1− δ and
all citizens receive a breakdown utility of 0. With probability δ the procedure is repeated in
period τ + 1 and starts with the selection of a proposer. We are interested in the proposals
that are made in the limit when δ converges to one.
The unanimous approval procedure leads to a well-defined game in extensive form. We
analyze the subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies of this game. A stationary
strategy of a citizen of type t, σt = (pt, At), consists of a proposal pt ∈ B and an acceptance
set At ⊂ B. The acceptance set At consists of those proposals that are accepted by a citizen
of type t. This specification results in a stationary strategy because pt and At are time and
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history independent. The social acceptance set consists of the proposals that are accepted
by all citizens and is given by A = ∩t∈NAt.
Under appropriate measurability conditions, a strategy profile σ = (σt)t∈N determines
a unique probability measure over the tax rates that are implemented and thereby the
expected utility Ut(σ) for each citizen of type t as evaluated at the beginning of the game.
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Since strategies are stationary, Ut(σ) is also the continuation utility of a citizen of type t,
the expected utility as evaluated at the beginning of any time period τ.
A strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies (SSPE) if
in any subgame the strategy profile σ induces a Nash equilibrium, i.e. for all t ∈ N, pt
is optimal given the strategies of all citizens, and At is optimal given the strategies of all
citizens. It is standard in the literature to restrict attention to SSPE with the property
that a citizen who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting a proposal will accept,
and we call such an equilibrium SSPEI. We will define the procedurally fair tax rates as
those that are proposed in an SSPEI when the continuation probability δ tends to one.
4 Tax Equilibrium
In this section we consider a strategy profile σ = (pt, At)t∈N that is SSPEI and provide its
characterization, called tax equilibrium. We show that tax equilibria exist and are unique.
Let Na = {t ∈ N | pt ∈ A} denote the set of citizens whose proposal is accepted.
Citizen i’s expected utility Ui(σ) of the strategy profile σ satisfies the equation
Ui(σ) =
∫
t∈Na
vi(pt)dµ(t) + (1− µ(Na))δUi(σ), i ∈ N. (4.1)
Recalling our assumption that a citizen who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
a proposal will accept, it follows that citizen i accepts the proposal β if and only if the
utility vi(β) he derives from β is at least as large as the continuation utility. Hence
Ai = {β ∈ [0, 1] : vi(β) ≥ δUi(σ)}, i ∈ N. (4.2)
Theorem 4.1: Consider a strategy profile σ = (pt, At)t∈N and the induced social acceptance
set A. If σ is an SSPEI then
[A] The strategy profile σ has a no–delay property: pi ∈ A for every i ∈ N .
[B] The interval [δp¯, 1−δ+δp¯] is contained in A, where p¯ denotes the expected equilibrium
proposal:
p¯ =
∫
t∈N
ptdµ(t).
1Suitable measurability conditions are that p : N → [0, 1] be A-measurable, and ∩t∈NAt be Borel-
measurable. When N is finite, no measurability conditions are needed.
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[C] The set A is a non–empty compact interval.
Proof: We must have µ(Na) > 0, for otherwise Ut(σ) = 0 from Equation (4.1) for all
t ∈ N , and citizens would have a profitable deviation by proposing any tax rate in (0, 1).
Let p¯a denote the average proposal of the citizens in Na, that is
p¯a =
1
µ(Na)
∫
t∈Na
ptdµ(t).
This expression is well-defined since we have argued µ(Na) to be strictly positive. We have
for every i ∈ N,
vi(p¯
a) ≥ 1
µ(Na)
∫
t∈Na
vi(pt)dµ(t) =
1− δ + δµ(Na)
µ(Na)
Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σ),
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of vi and the equality from Equation
(4.1).
Now consider the interval [δp¯a, 1 − δ + δp¯a]. Each of its points can be written in the
form (1− δ)β + δp¯a for some β ∈ [0, 1]. Since for every i ∈ N,
vi((1− δ)β + δp¯a) ≥ (1− δ)vi(β) + δvi(p¯a) ≥ δvi(p¯a) ≥ δUi(σ),
each point of the interval [δp¯a, 1− δ + δp¯a] is unanimously accepted.
We conclude the proof of the theorem by demonstrating that each citizen in N \ Na
has a profitable deviation from σ, thereby obtaining a contradiction, and showing that
Na = N . Thus take a citizen t ∈ N such that pt is not an element of A. Player t’s
equilibrium proposal pt is rejected and leads to utility δUt(σ) for citizen t. To obtain
the desired contradiction it is sufficient to show that there is a point β ∈ A such that
vt(β) > δUt(σ), for then proposing β, rather than pt, would be a profitable deviation for
citizen t. Suppose first that t ∈ N− ∪N+. As we have seen above, vt(β) ≥ δUt(σ) for each
β such that δp¯a ≤ β ≤ 1 − δ + δp¯a. Since vt is strictly increasing for t ∈ N− and strictly
decreasing for t ∈ N+ we must have vt(β) > δUt(σ) whenever δp¯a < β < 1 − δ + δp¯a.
Suppose next t ∈ N0. Then the function vt is a positive constant, so it follows that any
β ∈ [0, 1], and in particular any β ∈ A, has the property that vt(β) > δvt(β) ≥ δUt(σ).
From Equation (4.2) and the fact the function vi is continuous and concave it follows
that citizen i’s acceptance set Ai is a compact interval. It follows that also the social
acceptance set is a compact interval. 2
Henceforth we let [β−, β+] denote the interval A. By the preceding theorem the set A
contains an interval of length 1− δ, so it follows that
β+ − β− ≥ 1− δ. (4.3)
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The proposal of a citizen of type t is the point in A closest to his most preferred point.
Therefore, if t ∈ N+ then pt = β− and if t ∈ N− then pt = β+. For t ∈ N0 the indirect
utility function is a constant, so citizen t’s proposal can be an arbitrary element of the
social acceptance set. Hence Equation (4.1) simplifies to
Ui(σ) = m
−vi(β+) +m+vi(β−), i ∈ N.
Thus the social acceptance set [β−, β+] and the individual acceptance sets in an SSPEI are
such that
[β−, β+] =
⋂
i∈N
Ai, (4.4)
Ai = {β ∈ [0, 1] : vi(β) ≥ δ[m−vi(β+) +m+vi(β−)]}, i ∈ N. (4.5)
In what follows we provide a characterization of the endpoints of the social acceptance
set in an SSPEI as a fixed point of an appropriately defined function. Recall that hi has
been defined for each i ∈ N−∪N+ as the inverse of the function vi. For each i ∈ N−∪N+
we define
f1i(β
−) = hi(α+vi(β−)), where α+ = δm+/(1− δ + δm+), (4.6)
f2i(β
+) = hi(α
−vi(β+)), where α− = δm−/(1− δ + δm−). (4.7)
Define the functions f1 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and f2 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by letting
f1(β
−) = min
{
1, inf
i∈N+
f1i(β
−)
}
,
f2(β
+) = max
{
0, sup
i∈N−
f2i(β
+)
}
.
Lemma 4.2: Let [β−, β+] be the social acceptance set induced by an SSPEI. Then
β+ = f1(β
−),
β− = f2(β+).
Proof: We show that the second of these equations holds. The proof of the first one is
similar. Since β− is in the social acceptance set, it belongs to every citizen’s individual
acceptance set Ai. Hence by (4.5)
vi(β
−) ≥ δm−vi(β+) + δm+vi(β−), i ∈ N.
Using the fact that m− +m+ = 1 and rearranging we find that
vi(β
−) ≥ α−vi(β+), i ∈ N.
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Now consider the citizens i ∈ N−. For each such citizen i the function hi is strictly
increasing. Hence applying hi to the preceding equation yields
β− = hi(vi(β−)) ≥ hi(α−vi(β+)) = f2i(β+), i ∈ N−.
We conclude that β− ≥ f2(β+). Now suppose β− ≥ f2(β+) + ε for some ε > 0. Then
β− − ε ≥ hi(α−vi(β+)), i ∈ N−.
Applying the increasing function vi to the above inequality yields
vi(β
− − ε) ≥ vi(hi(α−vi(β+))) = α−vi(β+), i ∈ N−.
But then the point
β = (1− δm+)(β− − ε) + δm+β−
is in the acceptance set of each citizen i ∈ N−, because
vi(β) ≥ (1− δm+)vi(β− − ε) + δm+vi(β−)
≥ (1− δm+)α−vi(β+) + δm+vi(β−)
= δm−vi(β+) + δm+vi(β−)
= δUi(σ),
where the inequality in the first line follows by concavity of vi. Since β < β
− is clearly in
the acceptance set of each citizen in i ∈ N0 ∪N+, it is in the social acceptance set. This
clearly contradicts the fact that β− is the left endpoint of the social acceptance set. 2
The first equality in the preceding lemma expresses that β+ should be sufficiently low to
make it acceptable for all above average income citizens, and similarly the second equality
specifies that β− should be sufficiently high to be acceptable for all below average income
citizens. It motivates the following definition.
Definition 4.3: A tax equilibrium is pair (β−, β+) satisfying
β+ = f1(β
−),
β− = f2(β+).
As is immediate from the definition, every SSPEI induces a tax equilibrium. We now
establish the converse, stating every tax equilibrium corresponds to an SSPEI, showing
that the concepts are equivalent.
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Theorem 4.4: Given a tax equilibrium (β−, β+) there is an SSPEI σ with social acceptance
set equal to [β−, β+].
Proof: Define pt to be β
+ for each t ∈ N− and β− for each t ∈ N+. Let pt be an arbitrary
point of [0, 1] for each t ∈ N0. Define the individual acceptance set by Equation (4.5). An
argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4.2 can be used to show that Equation
(4.4) holds.
It is a routine excercise to demonstrate that no type has a profitable one-shot deviation
from σ. Here, a one-shot deviation in a subgame is a single deviation by a player at the
root of the subgame. It follows from a standard argument, see for instance Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991), that if there is a subgame where a type has some profitable deviation from
σ, then there must also be a subgame where this type has a profitable one-shot deviation. 2
Define the function f : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 by letting
f(β+, β−) = (f1(β−), f2(β+)).
Clearly the tax equilibria are exactly the fixed points of the function f .
Theorem 4.5: A tax equilibrium exists.
Proof: The set [0, 1]2 is a complete lattice and the function f has the property that
f1(β) ≤ f1(β′) and f2(β) ≤ f2(β′) whenever β ≤ β′. Hence Tarski’s fixed point theorem
implies that f has a fixed point. 2
Theorem 4.6: A tax equilibrium is unique.
Proof: Consider the function g : [0, 1] → R defined by g(β) = f1(f2(β))− β. Obviously,
a zero point β of g is in a one to one relationship with a tax equilibrium (f2(β), β) and it
follows from the previous paragraph that g has at least one zero point. We argue that g is
strictly decreasing, thereby showing that it has a unique zero point.
We write
g(β) = f1(f2(β))− f2(β) + f2(β)− β.
We show first that f2(β) − β is strictly decreasing in β. Consider some i ∈ N− and β, β′
with β < β′. Since hi is a convex and increasing function, we have
f2i(β)− f2i(β′) = hi(α−vi(β))− hi(α−vi(β′))
≥ α−[hi(vi(β))− hi(vi(β′))]
= α−(β − β′),
10
hence
f2i(β) ≥ α−(β − β′) + f2i(β′).
Taking the supremum with respect to i ∈ N− on both sides of the preceding equation
yields
sup
i∈N−
f2i(β) ≥ α−[β − β′] + sup
i∈N−
f2i(β
′).
Hence
sup
i∈N−
f2i(β)− β ≥ sup
i∈N−
f2i(β
′)− β′ + (1− α−)(β′ − β) > sup
i∈N−
f2i(β
′)− β′,
which implies that
sup
i∈N−
f2i(β)− β
is strictly decreasing in β. Notice that
f2(β)− β = max
{− β, sup
i∈N−
f2i(β)− β
}
,
so it is the maximum of two expressions strictly decreasing in β, and therefore strictly
decreasing itself. A completely symmetric argument shows that f1(β) − β is strictly de-
creasing in β. Since the function f2 is increasing, f1(f2(β))−f2(β) is decreasing in β. Since
f2(β)− β is strictly decreasing in β, we have that g is a strictly decreasing function. 2
The unanimous approval procedure results in a unique tax equilibrium (β−, β+) with
β− < β+. The tax rate proposed by an above average income citizen is β−, whereas β+ is
proposed by below average income citizens. A proposal β strictly smaller than β− would
be rejected by at least one below average income citizen, and a proposal β strictly greater
than β+ by at least one above average income citizen. At equilibrium rejections do not
occur.
5 Boldness
We show that, along any convergent sequence of tax equilibria, as the discount factor
converges to one, the social acceptance set converges to a singleton set.
Lemma 5.1: Let (δn)n∈N be a sequence converging to 1 and, for n ∈ N, let (β−n , β+n ) be
the tax equilibrium corresponding to discount factor δn. Suppose the sequence (β
−
n )n∈N
converges to a point β− and the sequence (β+n )n∈N converges to β
+. Then β− = β+.
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Proof: We know that β−n ≤ β+n for each n. Hence β− ≤ β+. The point β−n , being an
element of the social acceptance set in a tax equilibrium, is accepted by all citizens. In
particular, for i ∈ N− we have vi(β−n ) ≥ δn(m−vi(β+n ) + m+vi(β−n )). Taking the limit of
both sides of the inequality as n goes to infinity we obtain vi(β
−) ≥ m−vi(β+)+m+vi(β−).
Rearranging yields vi(β
−) ≥ vi(β+). Since vi is an increasing function for i ∈ N− we have
β− ≥ β+. 2
We define a procedurally fair tax rate as the limit of proposal in a tax equilibrium when
δ converges to one.
Definition 5.2: The tax rate β is procedurally fair if it is the limit of a sequence (βt,n)n∈N,
where βt,n is the proposal of a citizen t in the tax equilibrium corresponding to δn and
(δn)n∈N is a sequence converging to one.
In this section we provide a simple characterization of the procedurally fair tax rate.
In the characterization, the concept of boldness as introduced in Aumann and Kurz (1977)
plays an important role. The boldness of a citizen of type t at consumption ct is defined
to be the quantity u′t(ct)/ut(ct).
Consider a gamble where a citizen of type t receives `t with probability qt and ct + ε
with probability 1 − qt, where ε > 0. Let qt(ct, ε) be the maximum probability for which
a citizen of type t weakly prefers the gamble over consuming ct for sure. As pointed out
in Roth (1989), boldness corresponds to the maximum probability for which type t is
willing to accept the gamble, per dollar of additional gains, when ε tends to zero. That
is, bt(ct) = limε↓0 qt(ct, ε)/ε. Aumann and Kurz (1977) observe that the Nash bargaining
solution for the two player case can be characterized as selecting a division of the potential
surplus at which the players are equally bold.
Since we do not assume that utility functions are differentiable, we extend the notion
of boldness in the following way. The boldness of a citizen of type t at ct > `t is defined as
bt(ct) = ∂+ut(ct)/ut(ct),
where ∂+ut denotes the right derivative of ut. Left derivatives will be denoted by ∂−. We
define bt(`t) = +∞. Since utility functions are assumed to be concave, the right derivative
of the utility function is well-defined. Moreover, boldness is a strictly decreasing function
of consumption, as the numerator in the definition of boldness is decreasing by concavity of
ut and the denominator is strictly increasing since ut is strictly increasing in consumption.
The next result shows that boldness still admits an interpretation in terms of gambles.
Theorem 5.3: For ct > `t it holds that bt(ct) = limε↓0 qt(ct, ε)/ε.
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Proof: By continuity of ut and for ε sufficiently small it holds that
ut(ct) = qt(ct, ε)ut(`t) + (1− qt(ct, ε))ut(ct + ε).
We use that ut(`t) = 0 and rearrange terms to find that
qt(ct, ε)
ε
=
ut(ct + ε)− ut(ct)
ε
1
ut(ct + ε)
.
When ε tends to zero, we find that the first term in the product converges to the right
derivative of ut at ct due to concavity of ut and the second term converges to ut(ct) because
of continuity, so
lim
ε↓0
qt(ct, ε)
ε
=
∂+ut(ct)
ut(ct)
.
2
It follows immediately from Theorem 5.3 and the concavity of ut that an alternative
characterization of bt(ct) can be given as the limit inferior of difference quotients of ut at ct.
We observe that bt is a strictly decreasing function, which may have points of discontinuity.
For each β ∈ (0, 1) define
d1t(β) = −∂−vt(β)
vt(β)
= (wt − w¯)bt(wt + β(w¯ − wt)),
d2t(β) =
∂+vt(β)
vt(β)
= (w¯ − wt)bt(wt + β(w¯ − wt)).
The above expressions are well–defined since vt(β) > 0 for each β ∈ (0, 1).
We will show that these functions yield the appropriate measure of boldness of a citizen
of type t at a tax rate equal to β, where d1t applies to types with above average income
and d2t to those with below average income. We refer to this measure of boldness as tax
rate boldness. Indeed, for a type t in N+, tax rate boldness d1t(β) is equal to the usual
definition of boldness applied to the (increasing) indirect utility function −vt, which in
turn is equal to his boldness at the consumption wt +β(w¯−wt) induced by the tax rate β,
multiplied by wt − w¯, which equals the marginal change in consumption due to a change
in the tax rate. Similarly, d2t(β) is the appropriate measure for boldness corresponding to
tax rate proposals for below average income types.
Since boldness is strictly decreasing in consumption, it holds that tax rate boldness d1t
is strictly increasing in β, whereas d2t is strictly decreasing in β. What will matter in the
end is to convince the boldest citizen to accept a proposal, which motivates the following
definitions. For β ∈ (0, 1) let
d1(β) = sup
t∈N+
d1t(β),
d2(β) = sup
t∈N−
d2t(β).
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Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 present some crucial properties of the functions d1 and d2.
Lemma 5.4: The function d1 is a strictly increasing function on (0, 1) assuming only finite
values.
Proof: Consider some t ∈ N+ and some β ∈ (0, 1). Using vt(1) ≥ 0 and the concavity of
vt, we find that
−(1− β)∂−vt(β) ≤ vt(β).
Rearranging yields the inequality
d1t(β) ≤ 1
1− β .
This establishes the finiteness of d1 on (0, 1). We show that d1 is strictly increasing. Let β
and β′ be elements of (0, 1) such that β < β′. For t ∈ N+ we have
−∂−vt(β)(β′ − β) ≤ vt(β)− vt(β′)
We therefore obtain
−∂−vt(β)(vt(β′)− ∂−vt(β′)(β′ − β)) ≤ −∂−vt(β)vt(β′)− ∂−vt(β′)(vt(β)− vt(β′))
= (∂−vt(β′)− ∂−vt(β))vt(β′)− ∂−vt(β′)vt(β)
≤ −∂−vt(β′)vt(β),
where the last inequality uses vt(β
′) ≥ 0 and concavity. Dividing both sides of the inequality
by vt(β)vt(β
′) gives
d1t(β)(1 + (β
′ − β)d1t(β′)) ≤ d1t(β′).
Dividing by d1t(β
′) yields the inequality
d1t(β) ≤ d1t(β
′)
1 + (β′ − β)d1t(β′) .
Taking the supremum with respect to t ∈ N+ yields
d1(β) = sup
t∈N+
d1t(β) ≤ sup
t∈N+
d1t(β
′)
1 + (β′ − β)d1t(β′) ≤
d1(β
′)
1 + (β′ − β)d1(β′) < d1(β
′).
This completes the proof. 2
We now show that the function d2 is strictly decreasing exploiting a symmetry argu-
ment. This construction will be used once more in the proof of Theorem 6.1. Starting
from given a society we consider a new society where the citizens’ incomes are “flipped
over” the average income. The old and the new societies are “strategically equivalent” in
the sense that a tax rate of β in the new society corresponds to a tax rate of 1 − β in
the original society. In order to make use of this argument, we have allowed for negative
pre–tax incomes.
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Lemma 5.5: The function d2 is a strictly decreasing function on (0, 1) assuming only finite
values.
Proof: From a given society S = (N,µ,wt, ut)t∈N we create the society S˙ = (N,µ, w˙t, u˙t)t∈N
where w˙t = 2w¯ − wt and u˙t(ct) = ut(wt − w¯ + ct), for ct ≥ ˙`t = `t + wt − w¯. The average
income in the society S˙ equals that in the society S, namely w¯. The citizens N˙− with
below–average income in S˙ are precisely those with above–average income in the society
S and conversely, the citizens N˙+ with above–average income in S˙ are those with below–
average income in S. Thus N˙− = N+ and N˙+ = N−. The indirect utility functions v˙t in
the society S˙ are related to those in the society S by
v˙t(β) = vt(1− β), β ∈ [0, 1]. (5.8)
It follows that, if (β−, β+) is a tax equilibrium in the society S, then (1− β+, 1− β−) is a
tax equilibrium in the society S˙.
For each β ∈ (0, 1) we have
∂−v˙t(β) = −∂+vt(1− β) and ∂+v˙t(β) = −∂−vt(1− β).
It follows that
d˙1(β) = d2(1− β) and d˙2(β) = d1(1− β). (5.9)
The previous lemma, when applied to the society S˙, shows that d˙1 is a strictly increas-
ing function that assumes only finite values. There result follows since d2(β) = d˙1(1−β). 2
For each β ∈ (0, 1) we define
z(β) = m−d2(β)−m+d1(β).
It will be convenient to extend the function z to all of the interval [0, 1] by letting z(0) =
+∞ and z(1) = −∞. The function z is the difference between the supremum of tax rate
boldness among below average income types multiplied by their probability mass m− and
the supremum of tax rate boldness among above average income types multiplied by their
probability mass m+. The function z can be interpreted as an “excess bargaining power
function,” where positive values of z(β) indicate that below average income types have
more bargaining power than above average income types, causing increases in the tax rate,
and the reverse when z(β) is negative. Indeed, m+d1(β) represents the bargaining power
of the rich and m−d2(β) the bargaining power of the poor. We can think of z(β) as the
direction and magnitude by which β would be adjusted as a consequence of the prevailing
bargaining forces.
Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 yield the following result.
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Lemma 5.6: The function z is strictly decreasing on [0, 1].
A point β∗ ∈ [0, 1] is called a generalized zero point of z if z(β) > 0 for β < β∗ and
z(β) < 0 for β > β∗. When applied to the case β∗ = 0, then being a generalized zero
point means z(β) < 0 for all β > 0, and similarly β∗ = 1 is a generalized zero point of z if
z(β) > 0 for all β < 1. Since z is strictly decreasing by Lemma 5.6, it follows that z has a
unique generalized zero point.
Corollary 5.7: The function z has a unique generalized zero point.
At the generalized zero point β∗ of z the difference between m−d2(β) and m+d1(β)
is minimized, and is equal to zero if z is continuous at β∗. The point β∗ is therefore the
tax rate where the bargaining power of citizens with below average income is as close as
possible to that of above average income citizens. We will show in Theorem 6.5 that all
proposals made in bargaining equilibria converge to the unique generalized zero point of z
when δ converges to 1.
6 Procedurally Fair Taxation
In this section we establish that the generalized zero point of the function z lies in the
social acceptance set of the tax equilibrium, for each value of the discount factor.
Theorem 6.1: The tax equilibrium (β−, β+) satisfies β− ≤ β∗ ≤ β+, where β∗ is the
generalized zero point of z.
At this point it is useful to provide some intuition for why the tax rate boldness terms
d1 and d2 appear in our characterizations. Suppose indirect utility functions are differen-
tiable and suppose that we can replace the indirect utility functions by their first-order
approximations around the expected equilibrium offer β¯:
vt(β) ≈ vt(β¯) + v′t(β¯)(β − β¯).
A type t ∈ N accepts a proposal β if and only if vt(β¯) + v′t(β¯)(β − β¯) ≥ δvt(β¯). Using that
for t ∈ N+, v′t(β¯) < 0 and for t ∈ N−, v′t(β¯) > 0, we find that a type t ∈ N+ accepts all
proposals β satisfying
β ≤ β¯ − (1− δ)vt(β¯)
v′t(β¯)
,
whereas types t ∈ N− accept all proposals β satisfying
β ≥ β¯ − (1− δ)vt(β¯)
v′t(β¯)
.
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The endpoints of the social acceptance set are therefore given by
β− = β¯ − (1− δ) inf
t∈N−
{
vt(β¯)
v′t(β¯)
}
= β¯ − 1− δ
d2(β¯)
,
β+ = β¯ − (1− δ) sup
t∈N+
{
vt(β¯)
v′t(β¯)
}
= β¯ +
1− δ
d1(β¯)
.
Since the expected equilibrium offer is given by β¯ = m+β− +m−β+, we find that
β¯ = m+β¯ −m+ 1− δ
d2(β¯)
+m−β¯ +m−
1− δ
d1(β¯)
.
Since m+ + m− = 1, we can rearrange terms and find that m+d1(β¯) = m−d2(β¯). In other
words, we have found that the expected proposal is a zero point of the function z.
Since first-order approximations are not exact, it is not exactly true that the expected
proposal in the tax equilibrium equals the zero point β∗ of z, even if all indirect utility
functions were differentiable. Theorem 6.1 demonstrates that nevertheless it is true in
general that β− ≤ β∗ ≤ β+. It follows from Theorem 6.1 that the procedurally fair tax
rate is unique and is equal to the generalized zero point of the function z.
The proof of Theorem 6.1 consists of Lemmas 6.2–6.4 below.
Consider the bargaining equilibrium (β−, β+) and consider the bargaining power of the
poor and the rich, respectively, at the upper bound β+ of the social acceptance set. Lemma
6.2 states that the size of the social acceptance set β+ − β− multiplied by the bargaining
power of the poor m−d2(β+) is bounded from above by (1 − δ)/δ, and is greater than or
equal to this number when multiplied by the bargaining power m+d1(β
−) of the rich.
Lemma 6.2: Consider the tax equilibrium (β−, β+). If β+ < 1, then
1. δm−d2(β+)(β+ − β−) ≤ (1− δ).
2. δm+d1(β
+)(β+ − β−) ≥ (1− δ).
Proof: For t ∈ N−, it holds that the proposal β− is accepted, so δ(m−vt(β+)+m+vt(β−)) ≤
vt(β
−). Rewriting this inequality results in
δm−(vt(β+)− vt(β−)) ≤ (1− δ)vt(β−) ≤ (1− δ)vt(β+).
Since vt is concave, we find that
δm−∂+vt(β+)(β+ − β−) ≤ (1− δ)vt(β+),
and therefore δm−d2t(β+)(β+− β−) ≤ 1− δ. Since this inequality holds for all t ∈ N−, we
obtain
δm−d2(β+)(β+ − β−) = sup
t∈N−
δm−d2t(β+)(β+ − β−) ≤ 1− δ.
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This proves Lemma 6.2.1.
Consider some t ∈ N+. By concavity of vt we have that −∂−vt(β+)(β+−β−) ≥ vt(β−)−
vt(β
+). It then follows that
d1t(β
+)(β+ − β−) ≥ vt(β
−)
vt(β+)
− 1.
We take the supremum over all t ∈ N+ and find that
d1(β
+)(β+ − β−) ≥ sup
t∈N+
vt(β
−)
vt(β+)
− 1.
We complete the proof of Lemma 6.2.2 by showing that
δm+
(
sup
t∈N+
vt(β
−)
vt(β+)
− 1
)
= 1− δ,
or equivalently
sup
t∈N+
δ(m−vt(β+) +m+vt(β−))
vt(β+)
= 1.
Since all t ∈ N+ accept the proposal β+, we have
δ(m−vt(β+) +m+vt(β−))
vt(β+)
≤ 1, t ∈ N+.
Suppose there is an ε > 0 with the property
δ(m−vt(β+) +m+vt(β−))
vt(β+)
≤ 1− ε
for all t ∈ N+. Then
vt((1− ε)β+ + ε) ≥ (1− ε)vt(β+) + εvt(1) ≥ (1− ε)vt(β+)
≥ δ(m−vt(β+) +m+vt(β−)).
All citizens t ∈ N+ (as well as citizens in N− ∪ N0) therefore accept the proposal (1 −
ε)β+ + ε > β+ thereby contradicting that β+ is the upper bound of the social acceptance
set. 2
We are now in a position to prove the first half of Theorem 6.1.
Lemma 6.3: The tax equilibrium (β−, β+) satisfies β∗ ≤ β+, where β∗ is the generalized
zero point of z.
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Proof: The result is obviously true when β+ = 1. In particular, if δ = 0 then β+ = 1
and β− = 0 by Equation (4.3). Suppose now δ > 0 and β+ < 1. Subtracting the sec-
ond inequality of Lemma 6.2 from the first one gives δz(β+)(β+ − β−) ≤ 0. Since by (4.3)
0 < β+−β−, it follows that z(β+) ≤ 0. The result follows since z is a decreasing function. 2
We prove the second half of Theorem 6.1 using the already familiar symmetry argument.
Lemma 6.4: The tax equilibrium (β−, β+) satisfies β− ≤ β∗, where β∗ is the generalized
zero point of z.
Proof: Consider the society S˙ as defined in the proof of Lemma 5.5. By Equation (5.9)
the characteristic function z˙ in S˙ is related to that in S by z˙(β) = −z(1 − β), β ∈ [0, 1].
In particular, the point 1− β∗ is the generalized zero point of z˙. It is clear from Equation
(5.8) that, if (β−, β+) is a tax equilibrium in the society S, then (1 − β+, 1 − β−) is a
tax equilibrium in the society S˙. Lemma 6.3, when applied to the society S˙, shows that
1− β∗ ≤ 1− β− and the result follows. 2
Combining Lemma 5.1 with Theorem 6.1 we obtain the following result.
Theorem 6.5: Let (δn)n∈N be a sequence converging to 1 and, for n ∈ N, let (β−n , β+n )
be the tax equilibrium of the game corresponding to δn. Then both sequences (β
−
n )n∈N and
(β+n )n∈N converge to the generalized zero point β
∗ of z.
Corollary 6.6: A society has a unique procedurally fair tax rate.
As an illustration, consider the case where all citizens t ∈ N have constant relative risk
aversion preferences
ut(ct) = c
1−γ
t , ct ∈ R+,
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Moreover, we assume that
inf
t∈N
wt = 0 and sup
t∈N
wt = +∞.
It is straightforward to derive that tax rate boldness of an above average income citizen
t ∈ N+ is given by
d1t(β) =
(1− γ)(wt − w¯)
(1− β)wt + βw¯ , β ∈ [0, 1].
Since, for given tax rate β, this expression is increasing in wt, it attains the maximum
value when t is equal to the highest income citizen. Since the support of µ is unbounded
we have that the bargaining power of the rich is given by
m+d1(β) = m
+ sup
t∈N+
d1t(β) = m
+ 1− γ
1− β , β ∈ [0, 1).
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The tax rate boldness of a below average income citizen t ∈ N− is equal to
d2t(β) =
(1− γ)(w¯ − wt)
(1− β)wt + βw¯ , β ∈ (0, 1].
For given tax rate β, this expression is decreasing in wt, and the maximum over t ∈ N− is
therefore attained by the lowest income citizen. We have that the bargaining power of the
poor is equal to
m−d2(β) = m− sup
t∈N−
d2t(β) = m
−1− γ
β
, β ∈ (0, 1].
The unique zero point of the excess bargaining power function
z(β) = m−d2(β)−m+d1(β) = m−1− γ
β
−m+ 1− γ
1− β , β ∈ (0, 1),
is given by β = m−. The unique procedurally fair tax rate of a society populated by constant
relative risk aversion citizens is equal to the probability mass of below average income
citizens, irrespective of the shape of the distribution µ of types within the population.
7 Heterogeneous Societies
In this section we further analyze the procedurally fair tax rate for societies with sufficiently
heterogeneous citizens. What we have in mind is that there is sufficient dispersion in
preferences among citizens, in particular in terms of boldness. From a technical point of
view, we make the assumption that there are two risk–neutral types, one having the lowest
pre–tax income level and the other one the highest. Let
w− = inf
t∈N
wt and w
+ = sup
t∈N
wt.
Throughout this section we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 7.1: It holds that w− ≥ 0 and w+ < +∞.
Assumption 7.2: For each t ∈ N the utility function ut : [0,+∞) → R is continuous,
concave, strictly increasing, and ut(0) = 0.
Assumption 7.3: There exists a type a ∈ N with the property that wa = w− and ua(ca) =
ca, ca ≥ 0. There exists a type b ∈ N with the property that wb = w+ and ub(cb) = cb,
cb ≥ 0.
We define
β∗ = m−
w+
w+ − w¯ −m
+ w
−
w¯ − w− ,
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β∗∗ =

0, if β∗ ≤ 0,
β∗, if 0 ≤ β∗ ≤ 1,
1, if 1 ≤ β∗.
The main result of this section states that the tax rate β∗∗ is the procedurally fair tax rate
of any society satisfying the above assumptions. We begin our analysis by considering a
society consisting of only two citizens satisfying the conditions of Assumption 7.3. More
precisely, given a society S satisfying the maintained assumptions consider the society T
consisting of only the types a and b. Let the probability mass for the types a and b be
m− and m+, respectively. We first show β∗∗ to be the procedurally fair tax rate for the
society T . Then we argue that every tax equilibrium of the society S, for each value of the
discount factor, equals that of the society T .
Lemma 7.4: Let (β−, β+) be the tax equilibrium of the society T . Then
[A] β− ≤ β∗∗ ≤ β+.
[B] If β− > 0 and β+ < 1 then β∗ = β∗∗ and is equal to the expected equilibrium proposal.
Proof: For types t = a, b the indirect utility function vt is given by vt(β) = wt+β(w¯−wt),
β ∈ [0, 1], the function ht by ht(υ) = (wt− υ)/(wt− w¯), υ ∈ [0,+∞). Using the definitions
(4.6)–(4.7) it is straightforward to compute the functions f1b and f2a:
f1b(β
−) =
1− δ
1− δ + δm+
w+
w+ − w¯ + β
− δm
+
1− δ + δm+ .
f2a(β
−) =
1− δ
1− δ + δm−
w−
w− − w¯ + β
+ δm
−
1− δ + δm− .
Now suppose (β−, β+) is a tax equilibrium. Then, by definition it holds that
β+ ≤ f1b(β−) with equality if β+ < 1, (7.1)
β− ≥ f2a(β+) with equality if β− > 0. (7.2)
To prove claim [B] suppose β− > 0 and β+ < 1. In this case both (7.1) and (7.2)
hold with equality. Multiplying the first of these by m−(1− δ + δm+), the second one by
m+(1− δ + δm−), and adding them up we obtain
(1− δ)β¯ + δm−m+(β− + β+) = m−(1− δ + δm+)β+ +m+(1− δ + δm−)β−
= m−(1− δ + δm+)f1b(β−) +m+(1− δ + δm−)f2a(β+)
= (1− δ)β∗ + δm−m+(β− + β+).
It follows that β¯ = β∗. Hence 0 ≤ β∗ ≤ 1 so that β∗∗ = β∗. This proves claim [B].
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To prove claim [A] suppose that β∗∗ < β−. Then in particular β∗∗ < 1 implying that
β∗ ≤ β∗∗. Since β− < β¯ we obtain the inequality β∗ < β¯. On the other hand, since 0 < β−
the inequality in (7.2) holds with equality. Multiplying (7.1) by m−(1−δ+δm+) and (7.2)
by m+(1 − δ + δm−), adding them up and rearranging the result yields β¯ ≤ β∗, contrary
to the earlier conclusion. Similarly one shows that β+ < β∗∗ is impossible. 2
As an immediate corollary we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 7.5: The tax rate β∗∗ is the procedurally fair tax rate of the society T .
Theorem 7.6: The pair (β−, β+) is a tax equilibrium of the society S if and only if it is a
tax equilibrium of the society T .
We prove the theorem by showing that the function f as defined in the preceding section
for the society S equals that for the society T .
Lemma 7.7: The function f for the society S equals that for the society T .
Proof: We prove that for each β ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
inf
i∈N+
f1i(β) = f1b(β),
sup
i∈N−
f2i(β) = f2a(β).
We prove the first equality. The proof of the second equality is similar.
Fix some β ∈ [0, 1] and define the function gi : [0, 1]→ R by
gi(λ) = hi(λvi(β)), i ∈ N− ∪N+.
Notice that for each i ∈ N+ the function gi is concave, while the function gb is affine. We
first show that for each λ ∈ [0, 1] and each i ∈ N+
gb(λ) ≤ gi(λ). (7.3)
The inequality (7.3) is true for λ = 1 since gi(1) = hi(vi(β)) = β for each i ∈ N+. To see
that (7.3) holds for λ = 0 notice that gi(0) = hi(0) = wi/(wi − w¯). Since wi ≤ w+ = wb
we have gb(0) ≤ gi(0) for each i ∈ N+. At last, we prove (7.3) for an arbitrary λ ∈ [0, 1].
It holds that
gb(λ) = gb[(1− λ)0 + λ1]
= (1− λ)gb(0) + λgb(1)
≤ (1− λ)gi(0) + λgi(1)
≤ gi[(1− λ)0 + λ1]
= gi(λ),
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where the second equality follows because gb is an affine function and the inequality in the
last line holds because gi is a concave function.
Setting λ = α+ and using (7.3) yields
f1b(β) = gb(α
+) ≤ gi(α+) = f1i(β), i ∈ N+.
2
We thus conclude that the tax equilibrium of the society S for any value of the discount
factor is also the tax equilibrium of the society T . It follows that the procedurally fair tax
rate of the society S equals that of T , implying the following result.
Theorem 7.8: The tax rate β∗∗ is the procedurally fair tax rate of the society S.
When the income distribution is sufficiently dispersed, i.e. the case where w− = 0 and
w+ tends to infinity, we reproduce the result we obtained before for societies populated by
constant relative risk aversion citizens.
Corollary 7.9: For a sufficiently dispersed income distribution, the procedurally fair tax
rate is equal to the probability mass m− of below average income citizens.
In conclusion of the section we remark that Assumption 7.3 which clearly drives the
results of this section, can be weakened: Rather than requiring that the citizens a and b
be present in the society we can only ask that there be the citizens whose characteristics
are sufficiently close to those of a and b. More precisely, we can replace Assumption 7.3 by
the following assumption.
Assumption 7.10: There exists a sequence (tn)n∈N of types in N with the property that
wtn → w− and utn(c) → c for each c ≥ 0. There exists a sequence (sn)n∈N of types in N
with the property that wsn → w+ and usn(c)→ c for each c ≥ 0.
All results stated in this section continue to be true under this, weaker, version of As-
sumption 7.3, with the society T defined exactly as before. Only the proof of Lemma 7.7
has to be extended, as follows.
Proof of Lemma 7.7: One shows, exactly as before, that f1b(β) ≤ f1i(β) for each
i ∈ N+. Let the sequence (sn)n∈N be as in Assumption 7.10. Since the sequence of
functions (usn)n∈N converges pointwise to ub, the sequence (f1sn)n∈N converges pointwise
to f1b. It follows that
f1b(β) = inf
i∈N+
f1i(β), β ∈ [0, 1].
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The result follows. 2
The result that emerges from this paper is that under a wide variety of circumstances,
m− appears as the procedurally fair tax rate. This result is in sharp contrast to the
literature on fairness that often argues in favor of complete redistribution, implying a tax
rate equal to one. The result is also not out of line of what is observed in reality. Mankiw,
Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009) report that the average top marginal tax wedge in 2007, which
combines the top marginal income tax rate with the rate of value-added tax, is just above
60 percent in OECD countries, and was in fact nearly 80 percent in 1984. Moreover, in
this paper we assume a completely inelastic labor supply, and we do therefore not take
into account the negative incentive effects that result from taxation. Doing so is likely to
reduce the procedurally fair tax rate to values below m−.
8 Conclusion
We study the implications of procedural fairness on income taxation. Procedural fairness
is distinct from fairness and avoids the postulation of an ad hoc social welfare function
that has to be optimized. Societies are shown to have unique procedurally fair tax rates.
We also provide a characterization of the procedurally fair tax rate, which can be used
to demonstrate that the procedurally fair tax rate is equal to the probability mass m− of
below average income citizens in a variety of circumstances.
This paper has confined itself to a rather simple economic environment in order to
obtain sharp results. Many extensions of the model are worthwhile to investigate. First
and foremost would be to allow for elastic labor supply of citizens, the main channel through
which complete redistribution is avoided in the traditional optimal taxation literature. One
would expect that also in our set-up the incorporation of elastic labor supply leads to a
reduction of the optimal tax rate because of the usual incentive effects.
We have limited ourselves to affine tax schedules, meaning a fixed subsidy to all citizens
and constant marginal tax rates. Mirrlees (1971) argued that affine tax schedules are nearly
optimal in the context of the traditional optimal taxation literature. Though this view has
been challenged many times, Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009) claim that proposals
for a flat tax are not inherently unreasonable. It is an open issue whether flat tax schedules
are also nearly optimal in our framework.
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